Programmers make building distributed systems tractable by using a wide variety of abstractions to compose complex systems out of smaller components-for example, managing coordination between distributed processes using libraries that provide locking or consensus. Unfortunately, verification techniques for distributed systems typically do not match this style of programming, and modeling distributed systems often requires erasing these layers of abstraction to represent an entire program as a monolithic whole. This paper presents a new approach to automatically verifying distributed systems that use consensus as a component. We first define a new system model that offers a carefully designed consensus abstraction to provide global semantics for consensus while eliding specific algorithmic details. We then present a sound and relatively complete parameterized verification procedure for safety properties of distributed systems that use consensus. We further show how to use this procedure to synthesize correct systems given partial process definitions. We build a tool, Treaty, and show on several case studies that we are able to successfully synthesize and verify distributed systems that build on consensus without having to reason directly about the internals of consensus.
Introduction
Distributed systems are challenging to reason about-requiring an understanding of the interleaved behavior of multiple independent processes that must globally perform some task-and difficult to implement-requiring careful coordination of computation and communication. The latter problem is addressed by the systems community through the development of numerous layers of abstraction for building systems-messaging libraries, synchronization primitives, distributed data structures, computational abstractions, etc. The former problem has been tackled by the formal methods community through the development of myriad approaches for specifying, verifying, and even synthesizing distributed systems [6, 72, 65, 19, 61, 17, 47, 41, 64, 40, 7, 18] .
Unfortunately, work on formal reasoning about distributed systems is limited in its applicability, usability, and/or scalability. For instance, a large body of work [6, 5, 4, 69, 52, 74, 18] in automatically verifying distributed systems is limited to models of distributed systems with a fixed number of processes, thereby precluding its applicability to executable implementations of systems that naturally accommodate different numbers of processes. Recently, researchers have developed logic-based, semi-automated frameworks for verifying implementations of arbitrary-sized distributed systems [41, 72, 65, 61] . But these approaches require significant human effort and expertise, thereby limiting their usability.
Both automated and semi-automated approaches suffer from scalability issues due to the demands placed on computational resources and human effort, respectively. We observe that the scalability of existing verification approaches is further hampered due to another fundamental reason. Most distributed systems verification approaches do not comport with the layered approach, based on abstractions and "black box" implementations, that system builders use. Verification approaches tend to consider applications at a single level of abstraction. In particular, verification of larger-scale systems [27, 39, 3, 6] is not designed to leverage advances in the verification of smaller components-for example, the extensive work on verification of consensus protocols [60, 11, 50, 16, 26, 56, 52, 73] . The resulting verification burden of larger systems is thus substantial.
This paper begins to address this problem by incorporating abstractions of verified components into its verification approach. In particular, we target the problem of parameterized verification of distributed systems that use consensus as a coordination building block and propose a solution based on abstracting away the details of how the consensus is implemented or verified.
To tackle this problem, we introduce the following contributions.
The Choose Model for Systems with Consensus. In Sec. 2, we introduce a new system model-the Choose model-that allows encapsulation of (verified) consensus protocols into an abstraction with a specification of expected behavior. The Choose model extends existing system models for distributed systems [53, 6, 23, 22] with an atomic, global primitive, denoted Choose, that comes with precondition obligations and postcondition guarantees. Intuitively, a set of processes with proposals can use the Choose primitive to choose a subset of winning proposals in a globally-consistent manner. We carefully define the pre-and post-conditions of Choose, so that systems that use this primitive can capture the essence of consensus without having to directly model the behavior of any particular consensus algorithm. We further show that the Choose model enables symmetry-based reduction for verification [33] , thereby facilitating scalability of automated reasoning.
Parameterized Verification for Systems with Consensus. In Sec. 3, we tackle the parameterized verification problem for systems in the Choose model that seeks to automatically verify correctness of systems instantiated with an arbitrary number of processes. Unfortunately, parameterized verification is a well-known undecidable problem [67, 31] . While several decidable fragments have been identified over the last three decades [27, 28, 30, 29, 37, 39, 32, 15, 21] , these previously known decidable fragments do not support the Choose model. In re-cent work, we proposed a new model-the Global Synchronization Protocols (GSP) model [43] -with a decidable fragment expressive enough to support the Choose model. In addition to a decidability result, we provided cutoff results to enable practical parameterized verification for several classes of systems (called cutoff-amenable systems) in the GSP model-a cutoff is a number c of processes such that (non-parameterized) correctness for a c-process system entails (parameterized) correctness of any system with more than c processes.
The GSP model is at a higher, more abstract level than the Choose model. Hence, to avail of the parameterized verification results for the GSP model, in this paper, we develop a procedure for rewriting processes in the Choose model to processes in the GSP model and prove a correspondence between systems in the Choose model and the resulting systems in the GSP model. These results enable parameterized verification for systems that use consensus through a simple three step procedure: (i) translate the system to the GSP model; (ii) obtain a cutoff for the translated system in the GSP model; and (iii) perform non-parameterized verification in the Choose model using the cutoff.
Parameterized Synthesis for Systems with Consensus. While the cutoff approach enables parameterized verification, it may be difficult for a programmer to ensure that their system, when translated to the GSP model, will be cutoff-amenable. In Sec. 4, we present a procedure for parameterized synthesis in the Choose model. Specifically, given a partial definition of a process, our procedure synthesizes a completion of the process such that a distributed system consisting of an arbitrary number of copies of this process is correct. We do this through a standard, iterative counterexample-guided inductive synthesis (CEGIS) [66] ) procedure by introducing new synthesis constraints to ensure that the generated system, when mapped to the GSP model, is cutoff-amenable. Thus, our third contribution enables programmers to more readily build parameterized distributed systems and ensure that they are correct. Implementation and Evaluation. We implement our abstractions and procedures in a tool, Treaty, built on top of a recent verification and synthesis engine for distributed systems of fixed size [5, 6] . We demonstrate the utility of our Choose abstraction and cutoffs by performing parameterized verification and synthesis for a variety of applications that include sensor network-like systems, a distributed key-value store, a distributed mobile robotics system [24] and the Small Aircraft Transportation System (SATS) proposed by NASA [1].
Illustrative Example
In Fig. 1 , we present a simplified version of the landing protocol of SATS [1] . The goal of SATS is to increase access to small airports without control towers by allowing aircraft to coordinate with each other to operate safely upon entering the airport airspace. For the landing protocol, the aircraft coordinate to choose successive subsets of aircraft to progress to the next phase of landing, until just one aircraft is chosen to land at a time; thus, the protocol relies on multiple rounds of distributed consensus (or, more precisely, agreement). To enable formal verification, the landing protocol has been represented using both discrete [10, 57] and hybrid [46] models. We focus on the discrete model where the position of an aircraft is modeled using discrete zones (as opposed to real-valued coordinates). The landing protocol works as follows. An aircraft starts in a Fly zone and coordinates with other aircraft to Enter the airport airspace; only four aircraft are allowed to enter the airport airspace at a time to ensure there is enough room for any aircraft that misses its final approach. The entering aircraft head to either a left or a right holding zone represented by HoldLeft and HoldRight, respectively. Each holding zone can accommodate at most two aircraft, with each aircraft circling at a different altitude while waiting. From each of these holding zones, at most one aircraft is allowed to approach the Base zone where it can approach the runway and land. From the Base zone, at most one aircraft is allowed to move to the Fi-nalApproach zone where it can safely attempt to land, entering the Runway zone. However, due to unforeseen reasons (e.g., ice on the runway), the pilot may decide to abort landing. At that point, the aircraft needs to head to one of the holding zones, HoldLeft or HoldRight. The coordination needed in each state is encapsulated using our abstraction (depicted in the figure as cons). The transitions labeled cons(S, k) and ¬cons(S, k) are process-local representations of a global Choose operation (abstracting a round of agreement) with S participants and k winners; specifically, the local transition that a winning (resp. losing) participant takes is labeled by cons(S, k) (resp. ¬cons(S, k)).
The safety properties, provided by NASA, are as follows: (1) the airport airspace zones Enter, HoldLeft, HoldRight, Base and FinalApp can have a total of at most four aircraft between them; (2) the HoldLeft, HoldRight, and Base zones can have at most two aircraft each; and (3) the FinalApp zone can have at most one aircraft.
Systems like these, that use consensus as a building block to provide interesting higher-level behavior, can be verified using our framework, and also synthesized to ensure these safety properties. In our experiments, we were able to synthesize the guards and updates in the dashed red boxes, such that the system satisfies all safety properties. The synthesized parts correspond to interesting questions the developer of such a system might have. For example, how many aircraft should be allowed to move to HoldLeft and HoldRight, how many aircraft should be allowed to move to Base from each holding zone, how should an aircraft decide which holding zone to move to upon missing the final approach, etc.
The Choose System Model
We present a new system model -the Choose model -that allows encapsulation of verified consensus protocols into an abstraction with precondition obligations and postcondition guarantees. We first summarize the underlying system model without the consensus abstraction (which is based on standard models as in [5, 6] ), our specifications of interest, and the notion of symmetrybased reduction for this underlying system model. We then describe the proposed Choose model and show that it enables symmetry-based reduction.
Preliminaries
The Basic Model for Distributed Systems. We consider distributed systems consisting of a set of n identical system processes and an environment process. We fix a collection of finite types, including the type bool of Boolean values and the special type I = {1, 2, . . . , n} of process indices. We also permit enumerated types, arrays and records. Processes communicate by synchronizing on input and output actions. We support two types of communication: pairwise rendezvous, where two processes synchronize to communicate a value, and broadcast, where one process synchronizes with all others to communicate a value. 3 Processes. Formally, a process P is a finite-state, input-output machine described by the tuple I, O, L, 0 , V, T where I and O are disjoint, finite sets of input and output actions, respectively, L is a finite set of locations, 0 ∈ L is the initial location, V is a set of (typed) process-local variables and T is a set of transitions. Each transition in T is denoted by a, g→u −−−−→ where: 1. , ∈ L are the source and target locations, respectively, 2. a ∈ I ∪ O ∪ { } is the (communicating) action, and, 3. g → u is a guarded command where the guard g is a Boolean expression and the command u is a sequence of updates of the form lhs:=rhs; lhs is a local variable while g and rhs are expressions over local variables. An action a ∈ O is either a broadcast output message msg!!v or a rendezvous output message msg!v, where msg is the message label and v is the value communicated for local variable var msg associated with message label msg. 4 Similarly, an action a ∈ I is either a broadcast input message msg??v or a rendezvous input message msg?v. A transition with a = is called an internal transition and is not observable by other processes.
A state s of process P is a pair ( , σ) where ∈ L and σ is a valuation of the local variables in V . For a state s, we let s.loc denote the location in s, and s.val(v) denote the value of the local variable v in s.
Let S be the set of all states of process P . Let σ 0 denote the initial valuation and s 0 = ( 0 , σ 0 ) denote the initial state of P . An execution/run of process P is a possibly infinite sequence ( 0 , σ 0 ), ( 1 , σ 1 ), . . . of states in S obtained by executing enabled transitions: for each j ≥ 0, there is a transition j a, g→u −−−−→ j+1 ∈ T for some action a such that σ j satisfies the guard g and σ j+1 is obtained by applying the update u to σ j .
We use E to denote the environment process and use S E , s 0,E etc. to denote its set of states, initial state etc., respectively.
Composition of Processes.
We define the interleaving-based composition of n identical system processes P 1 , . . . , P n and the environment process E as a global transition system M(n) = Q, q 0 , R , parameterized by the number of processes n, where:
1. Q = S n × S E is the set of global states, 2. q 0 = (s 0,1 , . . . , s 0,n , s 0,E ) is the initial global state, and, 3. R ⊆ Q × Q is the set of global transitions (corresponding to two processes synchronizing via rendezvous communication, or, all processes synchronizing via broadcast communication, or, a single process making an internal transition). For instance, R includes a global transition (q, q ) corresponding to a rendezvous communication if there exist processes P i , P j with local
respectively, such that (i) in global state q, processes P i and P j are in locations i and j , respectively, and the guards g i and g j evaluate to true, and, (ii) global state q is obtained from q by updating the locations of P i , P j to i , j , respectively and applying the sequence of updates u i ; var msg :=v; u j . Global transitions corresponding to broadcast communication and internal transitions can be formalized similarly.
In what follows, we use M and M(n) interchangeably, using the latter only when we need to make the parameter n explicit. Additionally, we refer to a system process simply as a process, unless necessary.
An execution/run of the global transition system M is a (possibly infinite) sequence of states, q 0 , q 1 , . . ., in Q such that for each j ≥ 0, (q j , q j+1 ) ∈ R. A state q is reachable if there exists a finite execution of M that ends in q.
Correctness Specifications. The expected behavior of the global transition system M is specified using safety properties in linear temporal logic (LTL) [55] . The global transition system can be augmented with error states E ⊆ Q to capture violations of safety specifications -the system M is safe if it has no reachable error states. Given a safety specification φ, we use the standard notation M |= φ to denote that M is safe.
Symmetry for Parameterized Reasoning and Efficient Verification. The ability to do automated parameterized reasoning for systems with an arbitrary number of processes hinges on the number of different types of processes being bounded (in our system model, there are two types of processes, system and environment). Thus, parameterized systems naturally exhibit many similar global behaviors that are independent of specific process indices. In particular, a global transition system M is said to be fully-symmetric if its transition relation R is invariant under permutations over the set of process indices I: ∀π ∈ P G. π(R) = R, where P G is the set of all permutations over I and π(R) = {(π(q 1 ), π(q 2 )) : (q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ R}. We refer the reader to Appendix A.1 for a complete treatment of the notion of the full symmetry that includes a definition of permutation of global states (i.e., defines π(q)) as well as sufficient, process-local syntactic constraints that entail full symmetry.
Full symmetry offers another advantage -it is possible to greatly improve the verification time complexity of fully-symmetric systems through symmetry reduction that essentially involves collapsing symmetric behaviors in M [33] .
For the above reasons, we focus on fully-symmetric, parameterized systems. Thus, in what follows, we assume that the global transition systems in the basic model are fully-symmetric and we show later that, under this assumption, global transition systems in our proposed Choose model are also fully-symmetric.
The Choose Model for Distributed Systems with Consensus
Consensus protocols and, more broadly, distributed agreement protocols such as leader election, k-set agreement [14] , Paxos [49] and Multi-Paxos [12] enable their participants to collectively decide on a set of proposals in a distributed setting. While there are many different strategies for distributed agreement, any distributed agreement protocol boils down to selecting a set of winning proposals in a globally consistent way from a set of proposals provided by the participants. Breaking this down further, any correct agreement protocol implementation satisfies the following precondition and postcondition. C1 Consistent Participants Precondition. The agreement round starts when all participating processes agree on with whom to invoke the protocol. 5
C2 Consistent Winners Postcondition. When the agreement round ends, all participants agree on the set of winning proposals. Thus, to encapsulate rounds of agreement, the Choose model extends the basic model from Sec. 2.1 with a special atomic global transition, denoted Choose, that comes with a specification of expected behavior, expressed as the preconditionpostcondition pair (C1,C2). We make this more precise in what follows.
Let us fix a round of agreement with participants S ⊆ I, cardinality k (corresponding to the number of proposals to be agreed upon), proposal variable pv on whose value(s) the participants wish to agree, and agreement variable wv where each participant expects the results of agreement to be available. We model this agreement round with a nondeterministic, atomic global Choose transition from a GlobalAgreementStart state that satisfies precondition C1 to a set of GlobalAgreementEnd states, each satisfying postcondition C2. In what follows, we characterize such global states, and show how to abstract various agreement protocols using Choose transitions.
Identifying GlobalAgreementStart States. For this round of agreement, let C ⊆ L be the set of locations from which the participating processes in this agreement round may begin the round. A global state is a GlobalAgreementStart state, q start , if there exists a set S of processes that are in such locations C and have consistent participant sets -essentially satisfying condition C1. Formally, (1) ∀i ∈ S : q start [i].loc ∈ C, and, (2) ∀i, j ∈ S : (S i = S j ), where q[i] denotes the local state of process P i in global state q and S i denotes the local set of participants 6 constructed by process P i .
While practical agreement protocols share precondition C1, they have slightly different objectives. For instance, Paxos [49] aims to achieve agreement over a value while a leader election protocol aims to partition the participants into leaders and followers. In order to capture such differences, we carefully design our Choose transitions to enable agreement on a set of values as well as the ability to partition the participants into "winners" and "losers". This is reflected in the way we characterize GlobalAgreementEnd states below.
Identifying GlobalAgreementEnd States. Once a valid q start state is identified, each participant P i submits a proposal prop i = (i, q start [i].val(pv)), consisting of the proposing process's index and the value it proposes from its proposal variable pv. Let W * denote the set of all k-sized sets of proposals (i.e., sets of proposals that may "win" the round) and let W ∈ W * denote a set of such winning proposals. Additionally, let w i (l i , resp.) denote the location to which P i form of the precondition C1 is to enable systems to invoke agreement rounds with only a subset of processes (e.g., in Fig. 1 , only aircraft in the Enter zone participate in the agreement round leading to the HoldLeft and HoldRight zones). 6 We place no restrictions on how these sets are constructed. While such sets are usually predefined, we allow more flexibility by permitting processes to exchange messages to construct them.
transitions when prop i ∈ W (prop i ∈ W, resp.). For each W ∈ W * , we identify a GlobalAgreementEnd state, q W end , satisfying condition C2 as follows:
Thus, in any possible q W end , the location of each participating process P i is updated to w i or l i and the value of the agreement variable wv is updated with the results of agreement.
Various Agreement Protocols as Choose Transitions. We demonstrate the utility of the Choose model in capturing different real-world agreement protocols with Choose transitions. We consider two variants of agreement: valuestore and partition-and-move. Value-store agreement can model protocols like Paxos [49] and k-set agreement [14] which target agreement on (a set of) values without necessarily distinguishing between the "winning processes" and "losing processes"; to enable parameterized reasoning over systems in the Choose model, we restrict the domain of such values to be finite. On the other hand, partition-and-move agreement can model variants of leader election protocols which partition the participants into winning processes and losing processes and are not typically concerned with variable valuations; to partition an unbounded number of processes, partition-and-move involves transitioning participants into a finite number of distinct locations in a process definition.
In a process definition, we denote a round of value-store agreement with a lo- − −−−−−− → l for the losing participants. The locations w and l identify the partition of participants into winning and losing processes. The variables pv and wv are irrelevant in this variant as we are only interested in the partition; therefore, they are omitted.
Example. To illustrate the behavior of Choose transitions, we focus on a 2process system in a state q start (the relevant parts of which are shown in Fig. 2 ).
First, consider a scenario where the value-store local transition c
is part of the process definition. The state q start is a valid GlobalAgreementStart state satisfying condition C1 since both processes P 1 and P 2 are in location c and have consistent participant sets (since S 1 = S 2 = {P 1 , P 2 }). Here, processes P 1 and P 2 propose the values x and y, respectively, and try to reach agreement on 1 value. The Choose transition q start − → q x end (resp. q start − → q y end ), shown in the top half of Fig. 2 , models value-store agreement where x (resp. y) is the winning value stored in each participant's wv variable. Observe that both processes transition to the same location d. − −−−−−− → l are part of the process definition. Again, q start is a valid GlobalAgreementStart state. Here, processes P 1 and P 2 wish to pick one winner to transition to location w while the loser transitions to location l. The Choose transition q start − → q P1 end (resp. q start − → q P2 end ), shown in the bottom half of Fig. 2 , models partition-and-move agreement where P 1 (resp. P 2 ) is selected as the winning process. Observe that the values of the proposal variable pv and the agreement variable wv are unchanged for both P 1 and P 2 .
We finally note that value-store agreement directly captures k-set agreement [14] and can capture Paxos [49] 7 by setting k to one. Agreement protocols like Multi-Paxos [12] and Raft [58] can be modeled by using partition-and-move agreement to elect a leader, followed by the leader proposing values in subsequent rounds using value-store agreement.
Symmetry in the Choose Model. In a global transition system, M Choose = (Q, q 0 , R), in the Choose model, let R Choose denote the set of all Choose transitions in the transition relation R. Thus, R Choose consists of transitions of the form (q start , q W end ), where q start is a GlobalAgreementStart state and q W end is a corresponding GlobalAgreementEnd state. Let M = (Q, q 0 , R \ R Choose ) denote the global transition system without the Choose transitions of M Choose .
We refer the reader to Appendix A.2 for the proof. Intuitively, the proof is based on the observation that Choose transitions are oblivious to the identities of the participants and are hence invariant under permutations over I.
Remark. We do not make any symmetry-related assumptions about the specific agreement protocol implementation that the Choose transition encapsulates. Our abstraction is a safe overapproximation of possible results of specific agreement implementations (including ones based on non-symmetric strategies such as "process with maximum index wins").
Parameterized Verification in the Choose Model
Recall that we proposed the Choose model to incorporate an abstraction of agreement protocols within distributed systems that use agreement as a building block. Since our ultimate goal is to perform parameterized verification of such systems, we first formalize this verification problem over global transition systems in the Choose model and present an overview of our solution. In what follows, we fix a system process P , an environment process E and a safety specification φ. 8 Definition 1 (Parameterized Verification in the Choose Model). The goal is to decide if ∀n. M(n) |= φ.
Unfortunately, the parameterized verification problem is known to be undecidable [67, 31] , and previously known decidable fragments [27, 28, 30, 29, 37, 39, 32, 15, 21] do not support our new Choose model. Hence, it is not immediately obvious if the problem in Def. 1 is even decidable.
In recent work, we identified a new decidable fragment [43] that provides a pathway for decidable parameterized verification in the Choose model.
Specifically, we proposed the Global Synchronization Protocols (GSP) model [43] and showed that this model admits decidable parameterized verification of wellbehaved systems (in the GSP model) for permissible safety specifications (as summarized in Sec. 3.1). In addition, to enable practical parameterized verification, we provided cutoff results for parameterized verification of cutoffamenable processes in the GSP model; these results enable reduction of the parameterized verification problem to a verification problem over a fixed number of processes.
Formally, a cutoff for a class of processes Π (that includes system process P and environment process E) and a class of specifications Φ (that includes specification φ) is a number c ∈ N such that:
While the GSP model exhibits several desirable properties, it is on a higher, more abstract level than the Choose model (e.g., it uses counter abstraction for global states and does not directly support local variables). Hence, in order to take advantage of the parameterized verification results for the GSP Algorithm 1: Parameterized Verification Procedure for the Choose Model 1 procedure Verify(PChoose, φ)
Input : PChoose, process definition in the Choose model φ, permissible safety specification Output: Safe, Unsafe, or Unknown
return Safe return Unknown model, in this paper, we provide a procedure (Sec. 3.2) for rewriting processes in the Choose model to processes in the GSP model and prove a correspondence (specifically, a simulation equivalence) between systems in the Choose model and systems in the GSP model generated by the rewriting procedure. Based on these results, we solve the problem in Def. 1 for a class of systems in the Choose model according to Algo. 1. 9 The key steps in Algo. 1 can be summarized as follows: (i) we rewrite a process definition in the Choose model to one in the GSP model (Line 2); (ii) we obtain a cutoff in the GSP model (Line 6); (iii) we use the cutoff to build a fixed-size transition system in the Choose model, M Choose (c); and (iv) we use a standard verifier to check safety of M Choose (c) in the Choose model (Line 8).
We next summarize the GSP model [43] , present a procedure to rewrite processes in the Choose model to the GSP model, and establish a correspondence between systems in the Choose and GSP models to enable parameterized verification for the former.
The GSP Model [43]
The GSP model generalizes most of the existing synchronization-based models in the literature [37, 39, 20, 36] , including models based on rendezvous and broadcasts. In the GSP model, each global transition synchronizes all processes, where multiple processes act as the senders of the transition, while the remaining processes react uniformly as receivers. The model supports two types of transitions: (i) a k-sender transition, which can fire only if the number of processes available to act as senders in the transition is at least k and is fired with exactly k processes acting as senders, and, (ii) a k-maximal transition, which can fire only if the number m of processes available to act as senders is at least one and is fired with k processes acting as senders if m ≥ k, or, with m processes acting as senders, otherwise. Additionally, each transition can be equipped with a global guard which identifies a subset of the local state space. A transition is then enabled whenever the transition can fire and the local states of all processes are in the set of local states identified by the transition guard.
Processes. A process in the GSP model is defined as P GSP = A, S, s 0 , T , where A is a set of local actions, S is a finite set of states, s 0 ∈ S is the initial state, and T ⊆ S × A × S is the transition relation. The set A of local actions corresponds to a set A of global actions. Each global action a ∈ A has an arity k with local send actions a 1 , . . . , a k and a local receive action a#, and is further associated with either a k-sender or a k-maximal global transition as well as a global guard G a ⊆ S of the transition. An example of a process definition in the GSP model with local actions A = {a 1 , a 2 , a#} corresponding to global action a with arity 2 and global guard G a = {s 0 , s 3 }, is shown in Fig. 3 . Composition of Processes. Given a process P GSP , the parameterized global transition system is defined as
. . , n} |S| is the set of states, q 0 is the initial state and R is the global transition relation. Thus, a global state q ∈ Q is a vector of natural numbers, representing the number of processes that are in any given local state s ∈ S. The global transition relation R ⊆ Q × A × 2 S × Q defines how processes synchronize using a k-sender or a k-maximal transition to move between global states. In a global transition based on a global action a ∈ A with arity k, each of the local send actions a 1 , . . . , a k is taken by at most one process. To illustrate the semantics of global transitions, let the global action a in Fig. 3 be associated with a 2-sender transition. Furthermore, let a global state q be denoted as the vector |s 0 |, |s 1 |, |s 2 |, |s 3 | , where |s| denotes the number of processes in local state s.
-If q = 2, 0, 0, 3 (i.e., a global state with 2 processes in state s 0 and 3 processes in s 3 ), then q a,Ga − −− → q with q = 0, 1, 2, 2 is in R. In this transition, two processes act as senders: one sender via the local transition s 0 a1 − → s 1 and the other via local transition s 3 a2 − → s 2 . The rest of the processes act as receivers using the transitions labeled by the local receive action a#.
-Without a process in s 3 to take the transition s 3 a2 − → s 2 , e.g., in state q = 2, 0, 0, 0 , the 2-sender transition cannot fire. However, if the global action a is associated with a 2-maximal transition instead, then the transition could fire in state q since some senders are available to take the transition.
Parameterized Verification in the GSP Model. In [43] , we defined a set of well-behavedness conditions over the process definition P GSP to ensure decidability of parameterized verification; the decidability result itself is based on a reduction to a well-structured transition system (WSTS) [38] . The well-behavedness conditions essentially capture systems that move in rounds encoded as guards on the global transitions. Note that a large class of distributed systems [28] , including all our benchmarks, are well-behaved. Additionally, we considered safety specifications φ m that forbid reachability of certain local states by more than a certain fixed number m of processes (e.g., no more than two aircraft can be in the HoldLeft state in Fig. 1 ). Specifications of this type are called permissible safety specifications.
Theorem 1 ( [43] ). For systems composed of well-behaved processes in the GSP model, parameterized verification is decidable w.r.t. permissible safety specifications.
Cutoffs. With a careful analysis of the decidability results, we additionally provided cutoffs for systems composed of well-behaved processes [43] . Under certain conditions over a process definition P GSP and specification φ m , small cutoffs can be computed locally over P GSP ; when these conditions hold, the pair P GSP , φ m is called cutoff-amenable. We refer the reader to [43] for the exact conditions and cutoff results as well as the intuition behind them. Lemma 2. If the pair P GSP , φ m is cutoff-amenable, then c = m is a cutoff.
The Correspondence between the Choose and GSP Models
We now demonstrate that a Choose model process definition P Choose can be rewritten to a GSP model process definition P GSP in a way that establishes a correspondence between their respective global transition systems M Choose (n) and M GSP (n). We begin with an overview of the rewriting procedure (Algo. 2), providing high-level insights for mapping Choose transitions, and refer the reader to Appendix B for the complete procedure and a proof of its correctness.
Rewrite Procedure (Algo. 2). Since the GSP model requires a finite set S of local states, the procedure first identifies substructures in P Choose containing local variables over I (called Broadcast-and-Collect substructures), and maps these substructures to substructures that are equivalent modulo safety specifications and do not contain such local variables (Line 2). Then, Rewritable checks if the resulting P Choose does indeed have a finite local state space. If so, the procedure rewrites P Choose to P GSP step-by-step. Since the GSP model does not support local variables, for each location and variable valuation σ in P Choose , the procedure creates a local state s ,σ in P GSP (Line 5). The procedure then rewrites broadcast, rendezvous, and internal transitions between the newlygenerated local states as instances of k-sender transitions (lines 6, 7). Finally the procedure handles process-local Choose transitions as described below.
Mapping Choose Transitions. We utilize k-maximal transitions to model partitionand-move agreement with cardinality k. In such transitions, up to k participants act as senders (corresponding to the winners of partition-and-move), while all other participants act as receivers. For instance, consider the transitions in P Choose shown in Fig. 4a . The goal is to partition the participants in location c such that up to 2 participants take the winning transition to location w while the rest take the losing transition to location l. Let s c be any state in P GSP corresponding to location c in P Choose . For this example, the RewriteParti-tionAndMove procedure (Line 8) creates a 2-maximal action a and maps the winning transition from c to w in P Choose to the 2 sending transitions from s c to s w in P GSP and the losing transition from c to l in P Choose to the receiving transition from s c to s l in P GSP , as shown in Fig. 4b) . On the other hand, we utilize k-sender transitions to model value-store agreement. For each possible winning set, the RewriteValueStore procedure creates a k-sender action such that the set can only be chosen if the corresponding k-sender transition can fire; this ensures the validity of value-store agreement.
All such k-sender actions are associated with a guard G similar to that of the partition-and-move agreement.
The Correspondence Between the Choose Model and the GSP Model. We presented a procedure to obtain a process definition P GSP in the GSP model from a process definition P Choose in the Choose model. The following theorem formalizes the correspondence between the respective global behaviors of systems composed of these processes and the respective cutoff values for parameterized verification. We refer the reader to Appendix B.2 for the proof.
Theorem 2. Given P Choose , P GSP = Rewrite(P Choose ), the respective global transition systems M Choose (n), M GSP (n), and permissible specification φ, if P GSP = null and is well-behaved, we have:
Correctness of Algo. 1
Soundness and relative completeness of the parameterized verification procedure for the Choose model in Algo. 1 follows directly from Theorem 2.
Theorem 3 (Soundness). The procedure for parameterized verification in the Choose model, presented in Algo. 1, is sound.
Theorem 4 (Relative Completeness). If (1) the specification φ is permissible, and, (2) P GSP = Rewrite(P Choose ) is not null, is well-behaved and is cutoff-amenable, then the procedure for parameterized verification in the Choose model in Algo. 1 terminates with Safe or Unsafe.
Parameterized Synthesis in the Choose Model
We defined the parameterized verification problem for systems in the Choose model (Def. 1) and presented a solution (Algo. 1) based on cutoff results for parameterized verification in the GSP model (Sec. 3.1). We further leverage the cutoff results to enable parameterized synthesis of systems in the Choose model through synthesis of systems with a fixed number of processes.
Problem Definition. A process sketch P ??
Choose is a partial process in the Choose model with incomplete guarded commands. In particular, expressions in guarded commands in a process sketch may also include uninterpreted function symbols, along with local variables, actions, and function symbols with known interpretations. We assume that each known or unknown function symbol is equipped with a signature d 1 × . . . × d k → r identifying the types of its arguments and return value. Given an interpretation V that assigns to each uninterpreted function symbol in P ??
Choose a function of the appropriate type, we obtain a process P Choose that we call a completion of P ??
Choose under V. To be able to define the parameterized completion problem for synthesis of distributed systems with an arbitrary number of processes, we need to extend some of our existing definitions with their parameterized versions. A parameterized uninterpreted function is an uninterpreted function that is parameterized by I. An interpretation V I for a parameterized uninterpreted function is defined over I and is called a parameterized interpretation. Given a specific set of process indices, J , and a parameterized interpretation V I for the parameterized uninterpreted functions of a process sketch P ??
Choose , we can obtain completed processes P Choose,1 , . . . , P Choose,|J | under the instantiated interpretation V I (J ).
Definition 2 (Parameterized Completion in the Choose Model). Let E be an environment process with no uninterpreted functions, and P ??
Choose a process sketch with a set U I of parameterized uninterpreted functions. For a parameterized interpretation V I of U I and process indices J , let P Choose,1 , . . . , P Choose,|J | denote the completed processes under V I (J ) and M(|J |) denote the corresponding global transition system. Given safety specification φ, the goal is to generate a parameterized interpretation V I of U I such that ∀J . M(|J |) |= φ.
Proposed Solution. We present a procedure for parameterized completion given a permissible safety specification φ m and a process sketch P ??
Choose : 1. Generate constraints φ s to ensure that interpretation V I yields a process P Choose that is symmetry-compliant (i.e., entails full symmetry of the corresponding M Choose ). 2. Generate constraints φ w to ensure that interpretation V I yields a process P Choose such that P GSP = Rewrite(P Choose ) is well-behaved. 3. Generate constraints φ c to ensure that interpretation V I yields a process P Choose that has the same cutoff as P GSP = Rewrite(P Choose ) and that P GSP , φ m is cutoff-amenable. 4. Set cutoff c to be equal to m and invoke a (non-parameterized) completion procedure to obtain a parameterized interpretation V I such that:
Soundness. The soundness of this parameterized completion procedure follows from Theorem 3; the constraints generated in the procedure guarantee that, if synthesis succeeds and generates P Choose , Verify(P Choose , φ m ) returns Safe.
Implementation and Evaluation
We implement our tool, Treaty, on top of Kinara [5] , a verification and synthesis framework for distributed systems with a fixed number of processes. For each instance of agreement in a process definition, our implementation requires the user to specify the variant of agreement needed (partition-and-move or valuestore), the associated cardinality and an identifier that labels all associated local transitions. For value-store agreement, the programmer is additionally required to identify the proposal and agreement variables.
Evaluation. We summarize all our benchmarks (other than SATS from Fig. 1 ) and refer the reader to Appendix C for the process definitions, specifications, and synthesized completions. Chubby: Chubby [9] is a distributed lock service for coarse-grained synchronization with an elected leader node that handles client messages.
Distributed Smoke Detector (SD):
A sensor network application that elects a subset of processes, who have detected smoke, to report to the authorities. Verification Performance. In Table 1 , for each benchmark, we provide the number of local variables in the process definition, the number of locations, the cutoff used for verification and synthesis, and the execution time for verification. 10 We see that Treaty is able to perform efficient verification for all benchmarks, taking at most 17 seconds to verify our most complex benchmark.
Synthesis Performance. For our synthesis experiments, for each benchmark with U I uninterpreted functions (i.e.," holes"), we repeat the synthesis experiment 2 |U I | times, exploring all combinations of the |U I | holes. Additionally, we only allow completions that depend on |I| within the Broadcast-and-Collect substructure to ensure that the system can be mapped to the GSP model. In the last 2 columns of Table 1 , for each benchmark, we report the maximum number of CEGIS iterations and synthesis times across all combinations of holes, respectively. Notice that Treaty takes less than 7 minutes to perform synthesis across all benchmarks and all combinations of holes.
We take a closer look at the variation of synthesis time with the number of holes in Fig. 5 . In particular, for all combinations of a given number of holes, we show the average synthesis time (represented as a dot) and the best-and worst-case synthesis times (represented as end-points of a line through the dot). The leveling-off trend of the synthesis time (against the log scale) suggests that synthesis time does increase with the number of holes, but not exponentially.
Related Work
Automated Verification and Synthesis for Distributed Systems. A large body of work focuses on automated verification and even synthesis of distributed systems with a fixed number of processes [6, 5, 4, 52, 74, 18] . However, these approaches are unsuitable for parameterized reasoning and are unlikely to scale to systems with explicitly-modeled components such as consensus protocols.
Interactive and Deductive Reasoning for Distributed Systems. Tools based on interactive theorem provers accept distributed systems described using logic [72, 65, 71, 25, 73, 61] or DSLs [63] , and expect the user to specify inductive invariants to help generate a proof of correctness for arbitrarily-sized systems. For example, Disel [65] leverages the same observation we do-that distributed applications build on standard protocols like consensus-and incorporates abstractions of such protocols to provide compositional verification using Coq. The user is responsible for defining the high-level description of the protocol and for providing inductive invariants to enable both vertical composition of the protocol with its clients and horizontal composition with other protocols. In contrast, our approach is equipped with a simple abstraction for agreement protocols that facilitates vertical composition and fully-automated verification. Another body of work based on deductive verification [60, 59, 68, 17] enables more (but not full) automation by translating the user-provided system and inductive invariants into a decidable fragment of first-order logic (e.g., effectively propositional logic (EPR) [62] ), or a model with a semi-automatic verification procedure (e.g., the Heard-Of model [13] ). These approaches require deep knowledge of the system and underlying logic and are, hence, hard to generalize and fully automate.
The Parameterized Model Checking Problem (PMCP). The PMCP aims to automate verification for arbitrary-sized systems. Efforts to tackle PMCP (which is undecidable in general [67, 31] ) often seek to identify models with decidable fragments [27, 28, 30, 29, 37] and cutoff bounds [28, 45, 29, 27, 56, 8] . However, these existing models are not general enough to admit the systems we are interested in. PSync [26] is a specialized programming language for the development of verifiable consensus algorithms, but the user needs to provide invariants.
Parameterized Synthesis. Our approach can be seen as an instantiation of the approach in [44] , which is based on cutoff results and allows using any underlying synthesis algorithm, as long as it can guarantee that the conditions for cutoffs are met by the synthesized implementation. The approach in [51] is more specialized, but is applicable to fault-tolerant algorithms: it takes a sketch of the algorithm where only parameter valuations are missing, and generates a correct completion of the sketch by solving a set of arithmetic constraints. We do not consider faulttolerance in this work, but can synthesize richer completions.
Conclusion
We presented a new system model, the Choose model, that abstracts away the details of distributed agreement protocols, allowing applications that build on agreement to be verified efficiently. To enable parameterized verification and synthesis in the Choose model, we developed a rewriting procedure to an abstract model, the GSP model, with pertinent decidability and cutoff results, and, established a formal correspondence between the Choose and GSP models. We used our tool, Treaty, to perform efficient parameterized verification and synthesis for several applications that use agreement as a building block.
In ongoing work, we are focusing on extending our model to handle nonblocking communication and network failures using "channels" that can buffer or drop messages. In the near future, we plan to investigate restrictions on the system model that can enable support of liveness properties. Finally, in order to support systems with local variables whose domains grow with the system size, |I|, we intend to explore the use of a standard data abstraction (e.g., [48] ) over the variables' domains to bound the size of the local state space.
A Symmetry For Parameterized Correctness
We aim to reason about parameterized systems with an unbounded number of processes. Since such systems are designed to work for an arbitrary number of processes, their behaviors should be independent of a specific process index (as such index may not even exist in every instantiation of the system). As a result, such parameterized systems naturally exhibit many similar global behaviors. In this section, we define the notion of full symmetry, how to check if a system is fully-symmetric , and the effect of full symmetry on verification.
A.1 Symmetry Reduction in the Basic Model
Full Symmetry. Let π : {1, . . . , n} → {1, . . . , n} be a permutation acting on the set I of process indices. Let P G denote the set of all permutations over I. A permutation of a global state q = (s0, s1, . . . , sn) can then be defined as: π(q) = (π(s0), π(s1), . . . , π(sn)), where π(si) = ( π(i) , π(σi)) for si = ( i, σi). Note that π(σi) depends on the type of the local variable being permuted: if it is of type I, then π(σi) = σ π(i) , otherwise π(σi) = σi 11 . Definition 3 ( [34, 70] ). A global transition system M composed of identical processes with index set I is fully-symmetric if its transition relation R is invariant under permutations in P G: ∀π ∈ P G : π(R) = R, where π(R) = {(π(q1), π(q2)) : (q1, q2) ∈ R}.
Next, we distill local syntactic constraints over the process definition that entails full symmetry of M composed of n copies of said process. The underlying local transitions incarnating global transitions need to use process indices in a way that does not break symmetry. Process indices appear in two components of a local transition: the expressions of its guarded command, and the target process index in the case of rendezvous transitions. In what follows, we identify the syntactic constraints imposed on each component to yield full symmetry.
Syntactic Constraints on Guarded Commands. We require the guarded commands of all local transitions to be index-independent: the value of the guard and the effect of the update should not depend on the specific values of process indices, i.e., should be invariant to permutation of process indices [34, 70, 35] . For instance, equality and disequality of processes indices are invariant to permutation, but inequality (such as <) is not. More formally:
Definition 4. In a system consisting of identical processes with index set I, a guard or an update f is index-independent if ∀π ∈ P G : π(f ) ⇐⇒ f . Lemma 3 ([33, 34, 42] ). For a system with index set I, if the guards and updates are index-independent, then the global transition system M is fully-symmetric. Sufficient syntactic constraints for index-independence. While guards and updates over variables independent of I are naturally index-independent (since permutations only affect I), those over variables of type I must be proven to be invariant under permutations. Prior approaches [33, 34, 42] propose easy-to-check syntactic constraints on expressions over variables of type I that suffice for index-independence. These constraints restrict guards/updates over variables of type I to expressions checking equality (or disequality). For example, given local variables i1, i2 ∈ V of type I, these syntactic constraints permit guards that check if ii = i2 or i1 = i2, but do not permit guards that check i1 < i2. In the latter case, the guard values will differ if the values of i1 and i2 are permuted.
Syntactic Constraints on Rendezvous Transitions. The standard notion of a rendezvous communication, where some process Pi sends a message to some process Pj, is not suitable for parameterized systems since it depends on the specific index of the receiving process. Below, we give a condition on the local process definition that entails a fully-symmetric behavior of global transitions corresponding to rendezvous transitions. For a given process P with local transition set T , the following must hold: if the local transition msg!v, g→u − −−−−−− → , where some process Pi sends a message to some process Pj, is in T , then an analogous transition exists where some process Pj sends a message for all j = i ∈ I. As a result, the notion of rendezvous communications in a parameterized, fully-symmetric system can be defined as follows. Given the local rendezvous-send and rendezvous-receive transitions 1
respectively, a rendezvous communication in a fully-symmetric, parameterized system is modeled as a communication between some process Pi in state 1 (given g1 evaluates to true) and some process Pj in 2 (given g2 evaluates to true). − → 4. In order to show full symmetry of MChoose, we need to ensure that ∀π ∈ P G, π(t) = π(q1) a(j)! − −− → π(q2) ∈ R. Note that, for some π, the transition π(t) is a rendezvous communication between two processes P π(i) and P π(j) , resulting from two local transitions π( 1) a(π(j))! − −−−− → π( 2) and π( 3) a?
− → π( 4). By the premise of the lemma, we know that such local transitions exist for any permutation π ∈ I and hence π(t) ∈ R.
We note that broadcast transitions are fully-symmetric by nature: a broadcast operation does not need to specify a destination process index.
Verification Advantages of Full Symmetry. Emerson and Sistla [33] show that it is possible to exploit the symmetries present in a global transition system M (of a system with many similar processes) to improve scalability of model checking by constructing a compressed quotient structure M such that M |= φ ⇐⇒ M |= φ, where φ is any (CTL * ) specification. It follows from their result that M can be constructed for any M that is fully-symmetric and can enable symmetry reduction for model checking w.r.t. any LTL specification. We refer the interested reader to Emerson and Sistla [33] for further details.
A.2 Symmetry in the Choose Model
Since we introduced the Choose global transition, we need to show that full symmetry is still preserved. In a global transition system, MCh = (Q, q0, R), in the Choose model, let RCh denote the set of all Choose transitions in the transition relation R. Let M = (Q, q0, R \ RCh) denote the global transition system without the Choose transitions of MCh.
Lemma 5. If M is fully-symmetric, then MCh is fully-symmetric.
Proof. Essentially, we need to show that RCh is also invariant under permutations in P G, i.e., ∀π ∈ P G : (qstart, q W end ) ∈ RCh : (qstart, q W end ) ∈ RCh ⇐⇒ (π(qstart), π(q W end )) ∈ RCh Since a Choose transition is created between qstart (that encodes the set of participants S, a given cardinality k, and proposal variable pv) and a possible q W end (that encodes a winning set of proposals W ∈ W * ), we simply need to show that the generation of such winning sets (i.e., obtaining W * from a given S, k, and pv ref. Sec. 2.2) does not depend on the exact indices in S (and sometimes pv) and hence, is invariant under permutations in P G. We distinguish two disjoint subsets of permutations in P G: (i) P Gm = {π | π(S) = S} 12 (i.e., permutations preserving the membership of S), and (ii) P Gn = {π | π(S) = S}.
By the construction steps of Choose transitions, we know that W * contains all subsets of proposals from participants in S of size k. Hence, W * is invariant to permutations in P Gm (i.e., ∀πm ∈ P Gm : πm(W * ) = W * ). Since S is also invariant to permutations in P Gm, we can lift those observations to states: ∀πm ∈ P Gm : (qstart, q W end ) ∈ RCh ⇐⇒ (πm(qstart), πm(q W end )) ∈ RCh
For any permutation πn ∈ P Gn we obtain a new global state q start = πn(qstart) encoding the set S = πn(S). But then, we also have Choose transitions out of that state. That is, since the process definition does not identify a specific set of participants, all valid Choose transitions from S are also in RCh. Hence, ∀πn ∈ P Gn : (qstart, q W end ) ∈ RCh ⇐⇒ (πn(qstart), πn(q W end )) ∈ RCh
Since both RCh and R basic are invariant under permutations in P G, we conclude that MCh is fully-symmetric.
B Parameterized Verification in the Choose Model via the GSP Model
We expand on the the rewriting procedure presented in Sec. 3.2 to map Choose model processes to the GSP model. and show that, if the rewriting succeeds and yields a wellbehaved process, the global behaviors of the corresponding systems in the Choose model and GSP model are equivalent under permissible specifications and share the same cutoff value for parameterized verification.
B.1 Rewriting Processes in the Choose Model to the GSP Model
While the Choose model and the GSP model [43] are similar in many ways, one needs to account for the following differences when rewriting processes in the Choose model to the GSP model. 1. The Choose model supports local variables, including ones with domains depending on the number of processes in the system |I|, allowing a local state space that grows|I|. However, the global state representation in the GSP model requires a fixed local state space regardless of the number of processes in the system. Hence, while one can encode local variables with a fixed domain in the GSP model, supporting variables whose domains depend on I or |I| is not possible. We presented the procedure to rewrite a local process definition PChoose in the Choose model to a local process definition PGSP in the GSP model in Algo. 2 and describe its sub-procedures next. RewriteBroadcastandCollect. One common behavior in distributed systems is for a process to send an inquiry to all other processes by sending a broadcast, and collect the replies from |I| − 1 processes (typically in local variables whose domains depend on I or |I|) using rendezvous communication. We call this behavior Broadcastand-Collect. As stated above, the GSP model does not support such local variables. The procedure in Algo. 2 starts by identifying this substructure in PChoose, and rewriting it into another substructure in PGSP . Let b be a broadcast action. Additionally recall that ∈ L denotes a process location in the Choose model.
The RewriteBroadcastandCollect procedure first searches for a Broadcastand-Collect substructure in PChoose by syntactically checking if a structure similar to the one in Fig. 6a exists. If such substructure exist, the procedure rewrites that substructure within PChoose to one similar to that shown in Fig. 6b . Thus, this rewrite "summarizes" all the broadcast and rendezvous transitions representing queries and replies into one broadcast transition. The intuition behind the "special treatment" of this behavior is to encapsulate the fact that all processes (regardless of their number) will reply according to their local state.
Rewritable. Once the Broadcast-and-Collect substructure in PChoose is rewritten, the Rewritable procedure checks whether the process definite has a finite state space (i.e., the remaining local variables in PChoose are finite and independent of I. If this is not the case, the Rewrite procedure returns null, indicating failure to rewrite PChoose successfully into PGSP . We say a process PChoose is GSP-rewritable if the Rewritable procedure returns true. This condition is not too restrictive; in many distributed systems, including our benchmarks, variables depending on I are typically encapsulated within a Broadcast-and-Collect substructure (or, an agreement protocol). These guards restrict the behavior of internal and rendezvous transitions such that these transitions can only fire when all processes are in a particular region (subset of local states) until a broadcast transition moves them to a new region. Since the broadcast transitions separating these regions require all processes to synchronize in order to fire, no feasible behaviors are removed. These guards merely help the resulting PGSP be well-behaved.
RewritePartition-and-move. Let Ca be the set of all local states in PGSP where some partition-and-move agreement consa can be invoked. For each ci ∈ Ca, let wi (resp. li) be the state into which each winning (resp. losing) participant transitions after consa ends. Let k be the cardinality of the Choose transition. Then, we: -Generate the global guard G := Ca ∪ {s1, . . . , sm} where {s1, . . . , sm} denote the local states where the non-participants have decided that they have no interest in this agreement round (we assume there exists a flag f that is set in such states 13 ), -create new k-maximal actions a1, . . . , a k , and for each ai add for each ci a "winning" transition ci Fig. 7 , where two states, Scx and Scy, are shown as two states in location C where pv equals x and y respectively. In order for, say, the set {x, y} to be chosen as the winning set (and the corresponding k-sender transition to fire), there must be at least one participant in Scx to propose x and another in Scy to propose y. Note that all such k-sender actions are associated with a guard G similar to that of the partition-and-move agreement. The goal of this rewrite procedure is to simply ensure agreement on values that were proposed by at least one participant. If a given value was not proposed by any participant, then no process would be in a state from which that value may be proposed, and thus all the corresponding k-sender broadcasts that would make such value appear in a winning set would not be enabled.
Remark. The environment process E in the Choose model can also be rewritten into the GSP model model using the above procedure.
B.2 Correspondence between the Choose and the GSP Models
We presented a procedure to obtain a process definition PGSP in the GSP model from a process definition PChoose in the Choose model. Theorem 2 formalizes the correspondence between the respective global behaviors of distributed systems composed of these processes and the respective cutoff values for parameterized verification. In what follows we gradually prove this theorem.
Correspondence Between Global State Spaces of MChoose and MGSP . Recall that the set S represents the local state space in the GSP model. In MChoose, a global state qChoose ∈ QChoose of the form S n is a concatenation of the local states of all processes. In the MGSP , a global state qGSP ∈ QGSP of the form N |S| is a counter representation recording how many processes are in a given local state. Below, we provide an abstraction function that maps the global state space of MChoose to the global state space of MGSP . We define the function α : QChoose → QGSP as follows:
where 1(cond) evaluates to 1 if cond is true and 0 otherwise. The function counts the local states in qChoose and encodes that into the counter representation in qGSP .
Correspondence Between Transitions of MChoose and MGSP . Rendezvous-and internal-based Transitions. Both models support pairwise and internal transitions. As a result, the following correspondence between the global transitions based on those primitive holds:
where, a is a rendezvous or an internal action. Note that, for rendezvous transitions, we still need to show that the other direction holds. Since the GSP model does not support process indices, a global transition based on, say, rendezvous communications in the Choose model between process p1 in state s1 and process p2 in state s2 would correspond to a rendezvous transition between any process in state s1 and any process in state s2. However, we argue that if MChoose is fully-symmetric, then the index-based communications in the Choose model are equivalent to the communication actions without indices in the GSP model. Lemma 6. Let a be an rendezvous action and MChoose(n) be fully-symmetric. Then,
Proof. Recall that, in the Choose model, P G denotes the set of all permutations over I (process indices), and MChoose = (QChoose, R) is the global transition system where QChoose is the set of global states, and R = QChoose × QChoose is a transition relation. By virtue of full symmetry, we know that if a transition q1
Since permuting a global state in the Choose model does not change the local state of a process but just its index (ref. Appendix A.1), we know that: ∀q1, q2 ∈ QChoose if q1 = π(q2) for some π ∈ P G then α(q1) = α(q2) (since the abstraction function α only captures the local state space, but not the indices). It then follows that: ∀q1, q2 ∈ QChoose :
By Lemma 6 and property (1) above, we obtain the following result: Lemma 7. Let, MChoose be a global transition system in the Choose model, and MGSP be the corresponding global transition system in the GSP model. If MChoose(n) is fully-symmetric, then for the abstraction function α defined above we have:
Broadcast Transitions. As described in Appendix B.1, when obtaining PGSP from PChoose, we add a guard G to ensure that the broadcast primitives in both models have similar semantics. Hence, it is not hard to see that the following correspondence holds: Lemma 8. Let b be a broadcast action, and let G be a guard for b obtained by the RewriteBroadcastTransitions procedure described in Appendix B.1. Then,
Choose Transitions. The GSP model models Choose transitions using guarded ksender and k-maximal transitions. We show that the RewritePartition-and-move and RewriteValue-store procedures described in Appendix B.1 to handle the agreement logic yield an equivalence between Choose transitions and the corresponding k-sender and k-maximal transitions used to model them. −−−→ q2 be an partition-and-move Choose transition with cardinality k, b be a k-maximal action, and G be a global guard built as described by the RewritePartition-and-move in Appendix B.1. Then, ∀q1, q2 ∈ QChoose : q1
Proof. The semantics of the Choose transition in the Choose model pick up to a total of k "winning" participating processes from multiple possible start states {c1, . . . , cm} and switch their states to the corresponding winning states {w1, . . . , wm} while all the other participating processes move to the corresponding losing states {l1, . . . , lm}.
A k-maximal broadcast in the GSP model behaves similar to a Choose transition by moving k processes from their respective ci states to a winning state wi and all the other processes to a losing state li. Since we create a k-maximal broadcast with the same number of "winning" send transitions for each starting start ci, winning processes may be arbitrarily distributed among the starting states, similar to the corresponding Choose model transition. In both models, the rest of the processes move to the losing states.
Hence, the semantics of this broadcast enforces the Consistent Winners post condition of the corresponding Choose transition. The guard G ensures that the broadcast is only enabled when all the processes participating in the agreement round are in the right states, hence, ensuring the Consistent Participants precondition. Since the guard G is a set of local states, it is invariant to the abstraction function α (i.e. G is enabled in q iff it is enabled in α(q)). −−−→ q2 be a value-store Choose transition with cardinality k, b be a k-sender broadcast, and G be a global guard built as described by the RewriteValuestore in Appendix B.1. Then, ∀q1, q2 ∈ QChoose : q1
Proof. The semantics of the Choose transition in the Choose model pick a total of up to k "winning" values proposed by the participating processes starting from multiple possible start states {c1, . . . , cm} and switch the processes' states to the corresponding next states where agreement is reached on a set of 1 to k values.
It is easy to see that, by construction, each Choose transition in the Choose model is simulated by at least one k-sender broadcast that guarantees agreement on a given set of winning values. Note that the semantics of the generated k-sender broadcast ensures that it is only enabled when there exists at least one participant proposing each value of the set of winning values. This is achieved by placing the broadcast-send transitions from each state s with s.val(v) ∈ w, where w is the winning set. As in Lemma 9, the guard G ensures that the transition is only enabled in a state satisfying Consistent Participants precondition.
So far we illustrated that, given a GSP-rewritable process PChoose, the rewrite procedure in Algo. 2 yields a process PGSP such that there is a simulation equivalence between MChoose and MGSP . In what follows, we show this result still holds in the presence of the Broadcast-and-Collect substructure.
Simulation Equivalence Under Broadcast-and-Collect Substructure
In Appendix B.1 we define the Broadcast-and-Collect substructure in PChoose and how to rewrite it to an equivalent substructure in PGSP . We note that the Broadcast-and-Collect substructures yield an equivalent global behavior under some class of specifications (that does not refer to intermediate values of the counter or the ordering between the rendezvous replies), and that the cutoff value is not affected by this rewriting. In a nutshell, the set of safe behaviors, defined by such specifications, is invariant with respect to this behavioral change caused by this abstraction.
Encoding Local Variables in the GSP Model In Appendix B.1 we define the EncodeVariablesAndGuardedCommands procedure to encode the local variables of PChoose to the local states of PGSP . We note that this rewrite, in fact, is not visible in the global transition systems MChoose and MGSP and hence, has no effect on the simulation equivalence between them. By Lemmas 7 through 10, Theorem 2 holds. 
C Evaluation Benchmarks
In this section, we provide specifications, completions, and figures for out benchmarks from Sec. 5. Treaty can successfully verify all of our case studies. The transition diagrams demonstrate the complete implementation, with the holes we synthesize marked in dashed red boxes.
Remark. In this work, we focus on parameterized verification for safety properties. However, in order to enable synthesis, we also support checking if a system is live for the cutoff number of processes. The expected live behavior of (executions of) the global transition system M is specified by augmenting M with accepting states A ⊆ Q to capture violations liveness specifications. An infinite execution of M is accepting if it visits accepting states in A infinitely often. The system M is live if it has no accepting infinite execution.
C.1 Chubby Application
Specifications. The safety properties for this system are: (1) there is at most one leader at a time; and (2) each write is committed to all replicas before it is acknowledged. The liveness properties are: (1) client reads and writes must eventually be acknowledged; and (2) on a timeout, all servers must go back to the Candidate state where a new server is elected.
Synthesis Completions. For the actions in the dashed red boxes (Fig. 8) , the next state is left unspecified. The job of the synthesis to answer questions like: in the case of a timeout, where should the leader transition to, and how should the replicas react? Also, how should the leader server react to a read or write? How should the replicas react to a write?. In addition to that, we also allow the synthesis procedure here to figure out the right number of winners for agreement. The cutoff is 2 according to Lemma 2.
C.2 Distributed Smoke Detector
Protocol description. We consider a distributed smoke detector whose behavior is as follows. Upon detecting smoke, the detectors coordinate using an agreement protocol to choose at most two processes to contact the fire department. Specifications. The safety properties for the Distributed Smoke Detector system, depicted in Fig. 9 , are: (1) at most two detectors can contact the fire department; and (2) detectors that did not detect fire will never report detecting one. The liveness property is: if a fire was detected, then the system should eventually contact the fire department. With a reset signal, the verifier must make sure the the specifications are met for each round of the system: before the detectors go back to the detecting a new fire, they must correctly handle the current one.
Completions. We omitted the guards and updates in the dashed red boxes and were able to synthesize the correct completions to satisfy the specification. The omitted parts correspond to interesting questions the developer of such system might have. For example, should the detector attempt to build a participant set of detectors that sensed a fire? what should a detector do upon receiving a message from another detector? After the message exchange is done, should the detector attempt to contact the fire department or is other processes going to do so?. Since all detectors go back to the initial state at the same time, this system is around-based and the cutoff is 3 according to Lemma 2.
C.3 Distributed Mobile Robotics(DMRs)
Protocol description. As a larger case study, we model the system presented in [24] where a set of robots share a workspace with obstacles, and need to coordinate their movements. The robots coordinate to create a motion plan by successively choosing each robot to create a plan while taking into account the previous robots' plans. The robots choose one robot to make a plan, then the remaining robots re-enter agreement to choose a second robot and so on. As in SATS, each round of agreement determines the participant set of the next, but unlike SATS, the number of agreement rounds is not statically bounded.
Specifications. The safety property of this system, is that exactly one robot can be planning at a given time, hence no collision will happen 14 . The liveness properties enforce that any submitted task should eventually be executed. 14 We abstract away from the mechanics of creating the plan itself. Completions. As shown in Fig. 10 , the holes are similar to those of the smoke detector. Additionally, a hole corresponding to how should the robot handle a message from another robot that is done planning. The cutoff for this example is 3, according to Lemma 2.
C.4 Distributed Key-Value Store
Specifications. The safety property/ies of this system, is that any two processes in the Idle state must have the same stored value, so any read request from the environment will be serviced with the same value, regardless of which process receives the request.
Completions. The goal here is to check if the processes need to involove agreement upon a write request or if the value stored is unchanged. 
